STATE IMMUNITY STATUTES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE
Although the privilege against self-incrimination serves a vital

function in prohibiting a government from forcing a criminal
defendant to prove his own guilt, it frequently imposes undesirable
restrictions on the government's ability to acquire information
essential to make and enforce its public policies. To reduce the
impact of this limitation,states have enacted laws which immunize
a witness from subsequent incriminationin return for the witness'
testimony. With the extension of the fifth amendment to the
states, questions have arisen as to the constitutionality of such
state immunity statutes. This comment seeks to answer such
questions in light of current constitutionalstandards.

A S AN essential means of assuring "the effective functioning of
government in an ordered society," 1 governments traditionally have
been granted broad power to compel residents to testify concerning
any affairs of which they have knowledge. 2 Such authority is especially vital to the investigation and punishment of crimes, the proof
of which might otherwise be impractical. 3 The fundamental importance of this information-gathering power suggests that its exercise
should be free and that the corresponding scope of the duty to testify
should be broad. 4 However, in the United States, this basic public
right to information conflicts with another fundamental concept,
namely, that a man may not be compelled to be a witness against
himself in any criminal action. 5 This privilege was constitutionally
recognized by its inclusion in the fifth amendment 6 of the Federal
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 93-94 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
2 See, e.g., Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EViDENCE § 2192 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Wendel,
Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth 'Amendment Privilege: New Developments and New Confusion, 10 ST. Louis U.L.J. 327 (1966).
3Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 94 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
The testimony of its citizens is a vital source of governmental information and is
essential to effective regulation. 8 WxGNTORE § 2281; Comment, The Federal Witness
Immunity Acts in Theory and Practice: Treading the Constitutional Tight-rope, 72
YALE L.J. 1568 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963)].
' See generally Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1568 (1963).
r See Wendel, supra note 2; Note, 65 COLUM. L. Rlv. 681 (1965). The privilege
that "no man is bound to incriminate himself" in any court had its origins in the
ecclesiastical courts and did not become established in the common-law courts of
England until the middle of the seventeenth century. Even then, it existed for a
number of years as little more than a bare rule of law and did not bloom in spirit
until the early eighteenth century. Thus, it was never deemed to be the constitutional
1
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Constitution and in similar provisions of various state constitutions.7
In order to resolve the apparent conflict, both Congress and state
legislatures have promulgated numerous statutes which allow governmental bodies to require witnesses to testify in exchange for the
government's forfeiture of its right either to prosecute the witness
for crimes disclosed or to use his testimony in subsequent prosecutions." Denominated immunity statutes and enacted at the cost
of aborting the criminal law as to violations exposed, such legislation
rests on the theory that if the state removes the basis for fearing selfincrimination, the witness can have no valid objection to giving his
testimony." The validity of this theory was upheld by the Supreme
Court in Counselman v. Hitchcock,0 a unanimous Court reasoning that legislation can replace a constitutional privilege only if "it
is so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect" as the
12
privilege itself.11 As a result of the decision, a plethora of state
landmark in England that the American constitution-makers esteemed it to be.

8

WIGMORE § 2250.
OThe fifth amendment reads in pertinent part: "No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . ..

."

U.S. CONsT. amend.

V. Any use of the term "fifth amendment" in this comment is intended to refer
to the privilege against self-incrimination.
7See, e.g., CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13; N.Y. CoNsr. art. I, § 6; N.C. CoNsT. art. 1, § 11;
8 WIGMORE § 2252 n.3.
I Every state, without exception, has one or more immunity acts pertaining to
various offenses or legislative investigations. For a recent listing of most of the states'
witness immunity acts see 8 WIGMoRx
§ 2281. The multitude of federal immunity
statutes are listed in Comment, 72 YALE L.J. 1568, 1611 (1963).
9
Wigmore justifies the immunity principle on these grounds: "Penalty is the
creation of the law, not an inherent attribute in the act itself.... The treasons and
criminal libels which filled English prisons centuries ago are now non-existent, though
the same acts may be done today as then. The privilege protects only against legal
consequences of conduct; hence, the legal consequences lacking, the privilege does
not exist for such conduct .... A legislative provision, therefore, providing amnesty
for an individual offender or class of offenders who shall disclose the facts of the offense
upon inquiry is effective to remove the criminality of the offense, and the privilege
thereby ceases as to the person so disclosing." 8 WiGMoRE § 2281, at 491. See also Hale
v. Henkel, 201 US. 43, 67 (1906).
It should be noted that if the danger of subsequent incrimination is removed by
the running of the appropriate statute of limitations or like reasons, the fifth amendment cannot be claimed and therefore immunity need not be extended in order to
compel testimony. See Singer, State Grants of Immunity-The Problem of Interstate
Prosecution Prevention, 58 J. CaRm. L.C. & P.S. 218, 220 (1967).
:o142 U.S. 547 (1892). See notes 17-22 infra and accompanying text.
11142
U.S. at 585.
12
Since forty-eight states have constitutional provisions relating in form specifically
to self-incrimination, see 8 WIGMORE § 2252, immunity statutes have enjoyed wide
popularity on the state level, see id. §2281. However, because these state constitutional privileges vary from state to state, an 'immunity statute which is constitutionally sufficient in one state is not necessarily adequate in another. This disparity
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and federal 3 immunity statutes were adopted, some of which granted
immunity from prosecution to the testifying witness, while others
merely provided immunity from the use of such testimony in subsequent criminal actions. Because of these differing degrees of
immunity, substantial questions have arisen as to their constitutionality under the Counselman standard. Furthermore, two recent
Supreme Court decisions-Malloy v. Hogan4 and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission' 5-raise additional questions of the continued
efficacy of the Counselman rule' 6 and of the constitutional validity
of immunity statutes which cannot or do not immunize the witness
from prosecution by another jurisdiction. This comment seeks to
resolve these questions with specific reference to state immunity laws.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS
IntrajurisdictionalImmunity
The first constitutional challenge to an immunity statute was
presented by Counselman v. Hitchcock,17 a case arising under a
led to much variation in the statutes among the several states. Compare State v.
Quarles, 13 Ark. 307 (1853) (interpreting art. 2, § 11, of the Arkansas constitution
of 1836), with Henry Emery's Case, 107 Mass. 172 (1871) (interpreting article 12 of the
Declaration of Rights in the 1780 constitution of Massachusetts).
Not only does great variety exist among the statutes of different states, great variety
also exists among the several statutes of each state as well. Each state has many
statutes, most of which were designed at different times, to cope with different crimes,
and were tailored for use by different bodies. Thus, there is no core statute in each
state from which the rest have been fashioned. See generally Note, 20 RuTGErMs L.
REv. 336, 342-43 (1966).
8 Mr. Justice White, concurring in Murphy v. Waterfront Conm'n, 378 U.S. 54, 92
(1964), noted that Congress has enacted more than forty immunity statutes. Id. at
94. Furthermore, in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), the Court declared
that immunity statutes have "become part of our constitutional fabric." Id. at 438.
Actually the growth of immunity statutes on the federal level resulted not directly
from Counselman, which had invalidated the Immunity Act of 1868, ch. 13, 15 Stat.
37, on the ground that it was not co-extensive with the privilege; rather, it followed the
Court's decision in Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), which upheld the Immunity
Act of 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443, as fully accomplishing the object of the privilege. 161
U.S. at 610; see Wendel, supra note 2, at 342, 346-48.
1'

378 U.S. 1 (1964).

15378 U.S. 52 (1964).
' Malloy and Murphy have spawned numerous conflicting interpretations regarding the applicable standard by which the constitutionality of an immunity statute is
to be determined. See In re Bonanno, 52 Misc.2d 748, 277 N.Y.S.2d 909 (Sup. Ct. 1966).

Sobel, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination "Federalized," 31 BROOKLYN L. REv.
1 (1964); Wendel, supra note 2; Comment, Federalism and the Fifth: Configurations
of Grants of Immunity, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rlv. 561 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
12 U.C.L.A.L. Rav. 561 (1965)]; Note, 39 FoRDHrm L. REv. 77 (1964); Note, 1 GA. B.J.
366 (1965); Note, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 654 (1966); Note, 10 N.Y.L.F. 627 (1964);
Note, 20 RuTGEmS L. RFv. 336 (1966); Note, 73 YALE L.J. 1491 (1964).
17 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
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federal immunity statute which precluded the use of compelled testimony in any subsequent federal criminal action against the witness.' 8
After being promised such immunity, defendant Counselman refused
to answer questions concerning violations of the Interstate Commerce
Act on the ground that his answers might tend to incriminate him,
and was convicted of contempt of court for his refusal. 19 In reversing
the conviction, the Supreme Court enunciated the general standard
that immunity legislation, to be valid under the fifth amendment,
must afford the witness the same protection that he would have
received by asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. 20 The
federal immunity statute in question did not provide such coextensive protection, for it did not preclude the Government from
using defendant's testimony as a means of discovering other evidence
which could form the basis of a criminal prosecution. 21 In the
Court's view, the only type of immunity statute which would afford
co-extensive protection was one which granted absolute immunity
from subsequent federal prosecution for offenses disclosed by the
22
inquiring jurisdiction.
Because of state constitutional provisions protecting the privilege
against self-incrimination, many states enacted legislation at an early
date immunizing witnesses compelled to testify either from prosecution for crimes disclosed or from the use of testimony in subsequent
state prosecutions. However, Counselman was not applicable to
such state laws because, at the time of that decision, its constitutional basis-the fifth amendment-had not been adopted as part
18 REv. STAT. § 860 (1875) provided as follows: "No pleading of a party, nor any
discovery or evidence obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding . . . , shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used against him ....
in any
court of the United States in any criminal proceeding, or for the enforcement of any
penalty or forfeiture .... "
19 142 U.S. at 548-53. The District Court for the Northern District of Illinois had
found Counselman to be in contempt of court, whereupon he filed in the circuit court
of the United States for that district a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. When the
circuit court affirmed the order of the district court, In re Counselman, 44 F. 268
(C.C.N.D. Ili. 1890), Counselman appealed to the Supreme Court.
20

142 U.S. at 585.

27-Id. at 564-65.
2Id. at 586. The rule of absolute immunity from prosecution frequently has
been referred to as the Counselman standard. See, e.g., Note, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 654,
659 (1966); Comment, 12 U.C.L.A.L.ER.v. 561, 575-78 (1965). While the facts of
Counselman necessarily restrict the applicability of the standard to a federal grant
of immunity when the threatened prosecution is an intrajurisdictional one by the
federal government, the Court's language would seemingly require application of this
absolute standard to any jurisdiction to which the fifth amendment is also applicable.
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of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment2 However,
in 1964 the Supreme Court decided Malloy v. Hogan.24 Defendant
Malloy had been adjudged in contempt of court for refusing to answer questions during a Connecticut gambling investigation.25 In re-

versing the conviction, the Supreme Court first ruled that the due
process clause incorporated the fifth amendment's protection against
self-incrimination, thereby applying it to the states.2 6 As a consequence, the Court asserted that "the same standards must determine
whether an accused's silence in either a federal or state proceeding is
justified.127 Finding that Connecticut's protection was inadequate as
compared with the federal standard, the Court held that the defendant's federal privilege had been infringed and reversed his conviction. The Malloy decision said nothing about the validity of state
immunity statutes. However, it is evident that, by applying the fifth
amendment's federal standards to the states, Malloy made the
Counselman standard for federal immunity legislation determinative
also of the constitutionality of state immunity statutes.
ExtrajurisdictionalImmunity
The Counselman view that a valid immunity statute must prohibit the government which compels testimony from instituting subsequent criminal prosecution against the witness is, in essence, an
intrajurisdictional limitation. However, Counselman failed to consider whether a statute which did not proscribe prosecution by a
28 The bounds of the constitutional privilege in the interval from 1892 until 1964

were further delineated by three Supreme Court decisions. First, Twining v. New
Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), held that the fifth amendment was not applicable to the
states through the fourteenth amendment. In United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141
(1931), the Court found that the fifth amendment did not require that a federal immunity statute grant immunity from a subsequent state prosecution. Finally, the

introduction of testimony given under a state grant of immunity was allowed in
a federal court in Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
24378 U.S. 1 (1964).
2
rPetitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus. His application was denied
by the Superior Court, and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed.
Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744 (1963). Subsequently, the United

States Supreme Court granted certiorari. 373 U.S. 948 (1963).
20 378 U.S. at 3.
2
Md. at 11 (emphasis added). By the phrase "the same standards," the Malloy
Court was referring to the federal standard enunciated in Hoffman v. United States,
341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951), where the Court had said: "The privilege afforded not only
extends to answers that would in themselves support a conviction . . . but likewise

embraces those which would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute ...."
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different jurisdiction would satisfy the constitutional standard that
the immunity conferred must be co-extensive with the fifth amendment privilege. Nevertheless, four years after Counselman, the issue
of whether a valid immunity statute must confer extrajurisdictional
immunity was confronted in Brown v. Walker.28 Defendant Brown
was convicted of contempt for his refusal to answer the questions of
a federal grand jury, even though he had been granted immunity
under a federal statute which provided that "no person shall be
prosecuted.., for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing,
concerning which he may testify .....
29 The Supreme Court upheld
the conviction by broadly construing the federal statute to comprehend immunity from prosecution by both federal and state authorities.30 Such immunity, the Court held, was effective as a defense
to state prosecution because the federal statute upon which it was
based took priority over any conflicting state law by virtue of the
supremacy clause of the Constitution. 31
The reasoning of Brown was employed by the Court in 1954 to
reverse a state conviction of a witness based on testimony compelled
under a federal immunity statute which precluded only the use of
such testimony in any court.32 Two years later, the Brown decision
was expressly reaffirmed in Ullmann v. United States,33 the Court
28

29

161 U.S. 591 (1896).
Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 83, 27 Stat. 443.

30 Since the statute in question failed to specify that it applied to any particular
court, the Brown Court was able to assert that Congress intended it to apply to state

as well as federal courts. Thus the Court stated: "[T]he immunity extends to any
transaction, matter or thing concerning which he may testify, which clearly indicates

that the immunity is intended to be general, and to be applicable whenever and in
whatever court such prosecution may be had." 161 U.S. at 608. Congressional power
to prohibit the states from prosecuting a witness federally immunized under the statute

in question apparently emanated from the commerce clause, plus the necessary and
proper clause. Such an interpretation of Brown was given by Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 436 (1956). See Adams v. Maryland, 347
U.S. 179, 183 (1954). Another basis for such federal power is the combination of the

implied power to provide for the national defense and the necessary and proper clause.
See Ullmann v. United States, supra at 435-36.
S1161 U.S. at 606-07. The Brown Court refuted other arguments presented by the

defendant.

Even assuming the possible danger of subsequent extrajurisdictional

prosecutions, the Court dismissed it as a "danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial
character," not worthy of protection under the fifth amendment. Id. at 608. Fur-

thermore, the Court pointed out that the fifth amendment did not protect the defendant from the "annoyance and expense" of having a prosecution brought against

him. Thus, if the federal immunty statute afforded such a defendant a sound defense
to the charge, it afforded adequate protection. Id.
11Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).

83 350 U.S. 422, 439 (1956).
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construing a federal immunity statute similar to that in Brown as
34
proscribing subsequent prosecutions in either federal or state courts.
Thus, by such broad construction of immunity legislation, plus the
application of the supremacy clause, the Court fashioned extrajudicial immunity for a federal witness against either prosecution or
use of his testimony against him in criminal actions by the states.
It was thereby able to sustain federal immunity statutes under the
co-extensiveness standard of Counselman.
Although Congress, under the Brown rationale, could effectively
prohibit state prosecution of witnesses compelled to testify by the
federal government, that method of obviating the fear of subsequent
prosecution by another jurisdiction was inherently unavailable to
the states. States had neither the power to proscribe prosecutions
outside their jurisdictions nor a supremacy clause to give their
statutes priority over those: of other jurisdictions. 5 Thus, in spite
of its characterization as "illusory" in Brown,36 the fear of prosecution by another jurisdiction was a real one to witnesses compelled
37
to testify by the states.
The Supreme Court specifically recognized the genuineness of
this fear in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 8 decided on the
same day as Malloy v. Hogan. 9 After being granted immunity from
prosecution by New York and New Jersey, 40 defendants refused to
testify in a bi-state investigation of work stoppages on the ground
that their testimony might subject them to subsequent federal prosecution. Expressly recognizing this danger, the Court ruled that the
fifth amendment "protects a state witness against incrimination under federal as well as state law and a federal witness against incrimination under state as well as federal law."4 1 Applying that holding
to state immunity statutes, the Court declared that:
" Id. at 436.
"See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371, 375, 378-80 (1958); Jack v. Kansas, 199
U.S. 372, 380 (1905); 8 WIGMORE § 2258.

"0See note 31 supra.
07For a listing of states which recognized the genuineness of the fear of subsequent prosecution by a jurisdiction other than the one compelling the testimony
see 8 WIGMoRE § 2258 n.2.
8

378 U.S. 52 (1964).

378 U.S. 1 (1964). See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
11Immunity from prosecution was granted by both states since the Waterfront
Commission of New York Harbor is a bi-state body established under an interstate
compact. See 378 U.S. at 53 n.2.

411Id. at 78,
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a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may
be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony
officials in
and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by federal
42
connection with a criminal prosecution against him.
Unfortunately, no state has the power to grant a witness the required
immunity from the use of his testimony in a federal prosecution.
Nevertheless, to secure the states' right to compel testimony under
immunity legislation, the Court held that the federal government
would not be allowed to use either a witness's testimony or the fruits
thereof against him in a federal prosecution, if such testimony had
been compelled under a state grant of immunity.43 The holding
seemed to be founded on the fifth amendment. 44 Thus, the fifth
amendment itself was interpreted to provide extrajurisdictional immunity for state-compelled witnesses fearing subsequent federal
prosecution. Therefore, the Court was able to conclude that a
state immunity statute, in combination with the fifth amendment's
own restriction on the use of state-compelled testimony by the federal
government, 5 provided protection co-extensive with the privilege
of self-incrimination. Conversely, since the fifth amendment now
applies to the states, this rationale provides further support for prohibiting a state from using evidence compelled under a federal immunity statute in its own criminal prosecution of the witness.4 0
'12 1d. at 79.
8
Id.
"Courts and commentators have argued over the basis of the Murphy rule,
some asserting that the Court's power to promulgate a rule prohibiting the federal
courts from using state-compelled testimony rested on its authority to supervise the
federal court system, see 378 U.S. at 91-92 (14arlan, J., concurring), others arguing
that such power arises out of the fifth amendment, Comment, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 561,
578-80 (1966). In view of the general manner in which the Court stated the question presented by the case--"whether one jurisdiction within our federal structure
may compel a witness, whom it has immunized from prosecution under its laws, to
give testimony which might then be used to convict him of a crime against another
such jurisdiction," 378 U.S. at 53, and in light of its pronouncement that "in order
to implement this constitutionalrule ... the Federal Government must be prohibited
from making any such use of compelled testimony .... ." id. at 79 (emphasis added),
it is more reasonable to consider the fifth amendment the true basis for the rule.
4rIf the Court had not interpreted the fifth amendment as prohibiting the use of
state-compelled testimony in federal courts, state immunity legislation, and the power
of the states to compel needed information, would have been destroyed. This follows
from the fact that the states lack the power to restrict either the federal government or
other states from bringing criminal prosecutions against the compelled witness. See
note 35 supra and accompanying text.
"0See notes 28-34 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of how a broad
construction of federal immunity statutes, plus the application of the federal supremacy
clause, may be employed to prohibit state use of federally-compelled testimony.
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One further fear of incrimination which could not be removed
by state immunity grants alone is that compelled testimony might be
used in the prosecution of the witness by sister states. The Murphy
decision made no specific reference to this possibility. However, in
view of the Court's statement of the issue in terms of whether "one
jurisdiction within our federal structure" might compel a witness to
give testimony which might be used against him in "another such
jurisdiction, ' 47 it is reasonable to assume that the Murphy holding
was implicitly intended to apply between sister states. As a result,
once a state has compelled testimony upon a grant of immunity,
the fifth amendment would prevent a sister state from using such
testimony or its fruits in a criminal action against the witness. Thus,
Counselman'sco-extensiveness standard would be satisfied.
Current ConstitutionalStandards
The constitutional standards for judging the validity of federal
and state immunity statutes may now be set forth as follows:
(a) Counselman test: Both the federal government and-as a
result of the application of the fifth amendment to the states-the
states must provide absolute immunity from prosecution for crimes
disclosed in order validly to compel the testimony of a witness fearing self-incrimination.
(b) Murphy test: Both the federal government and the states
may compel the testimony of the witness, even though the witness
may fear incrimination in another jurisdiction, because the fifth
amendment itself now prohibits another jurisdiction from using such
compelled evidence or its fruits in a prosecution against the witness.
A reading of the Supreme Court's decisions indicates that if the
standards are complied with, federal and state immunity statutes will
afford protection co-extensive with the privilege against self-incrimination itself, as required in Counselman.
As stated, the standards present an obvious inconsistency; i.e., an
intrajurisdictional immunity statute must provide a higher degree of
protection than need be given extrajudicially. Several theories have
been offered to explain why the Court has permitted two dissimilar
standards to exist simultaneously. For example, it has been asserted
that the creation of the dual standard was a result of the Court's in17

378

U.,S. at 53.
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advertence.4 s The Court's failure to overrule Counselman in the
Murphy decision is the primary foundation for this theory. However, both the fact that Murphy did not present the intrajurisdictional immunity question, thereby not necessitating the overruling of
Counselman, and its express reliance on the co-extensiveness standards of Counselman while ignoring that case's "absolute immunity
from prosecution" rule lessen the plausibility of the Court's inadvertence as a sound explanation. A more reasonable rationale is that
the Court, adhering to Counselman's co-extensiveness standard,
deemed it unnecessary to grant immunity from prosecution in order
to give the same protection to a witness as he would have by asserting
his privilege against self-incrimination. 9 Underlying this finding
is the Court's elimination of the fear of the use of either the testimony
itself or its fruits in subsequent proceedings, a fear the Murphy
Court viewed as the basis for holding the immunity statute in
Counselman invalid. With this fear removed, the Court could
implicitly conclude that it no longer needed to adhere to the Counselman requirement of immunity from prosecution. While this analysis does not explain why the Court did not overrule the language
in Counselman requiring immunity from prosecution, it is consistent with the opinions of both the majority and Mr. Justice White.
However, since the Court has neither overruled one of the standards
nor explained why there should be a difference, this comment will
examine the constitutionality of state immunity statutes on the
assumption that both standards must still be met.
STATE IMMUNITY STATUTES5 0

Since the fifth amendment did not limit state action until 1964,
states were under no federal imperative to enact immunity legislation in order to compel needed testimony over a self-incrimination
48
'9

See Wendel, supra note 2, at 370.
See Comment, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Ray. 561, 577-85 (1965).

Depending
o0
on the particular statutory language, state-granted immunity attaches
to a witness's testimony either automatically, see, e.g., Mica. Comtp. LAws § 462.27
(1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-6 (1950), or upon assertion, or claim, of a fifth amendment or state constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, see, e.g., KY. REV. STAT.
§ 199.430 (1962); MINN. STAT. § 80.22 (1961). Claim statutes, on the one hand, en-

compass only minimum constitutional requirements. Absent invocation of the privilege, the witness may be deemed to have waived this right, Vajtauer v. Commissioner,
273 U.S. 103, 113 (1927); and since any testimony volunteered is without constitutional

protection, immunity need not be ensured. On the other hand, once specified condi-
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objection. However, the presence of similar privileges against selfincrimination in most state constitutions required state legislatures
desiring to compel testimony to enact statutes immunizing witnesses
from subsequent intrajurisdictional incrimination. Because most
states adopted, on an ad hoc basis, immunity laws to secure specific
information for such limited purposes as gambling investigations or
election laws supervision, a multitude of immunity statutes are now
In evaluating the validity and wisdom of these statutes,
in force.'
it is therefore necessary to consider the many distinctions which they
suggest: intrajurisdictional versus extrajurisdictional protection; immunity from prosecution versus immunity from use of testimony;
tions-usually that testimony be under oath and pursuant to a subpoena, see, e.g.,
MINN. STAT.

§ 297.09 (1961)-are met, automatic statutes extend immunity to all in-

criminating utterances. Since they offer greater protection than do claim statutes which

meet constitutional standards, there is no question of their validity.
Although a number of statutes expressly require a claim or use language, such as
"in spite of his objection," which clearly renders a claim prerequisite to immunity, see,
e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 150A, § 7 (1965); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-12 (1960),
the necessity of a witness's act to invoke statutory protection is not always clear. In
fact, the most usual phraseology completely avoids reference to the requisite procedure
precedent to its applicability: "No person shall be excused from testifying or from
producing any books, accounts, maps, papers or documents in any action or proceeding,
based upon or growing out of any alleged violation of any of the provisions of this
act, on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence... required from
him, may tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture .... " KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 66-114 (1964). Interpreting language very similar to this, an
Arizona court concluded that the protection was self-executing. State v. Chitwood,
73 Ariz. 314, 240 P.2d 1202 (1952). A Wisconsin court, on the other hand, reasoned
that the intent of the legislature must have been to grant no greater immunity than
was constitutionally compelled and that, therefore, absent a claim, incriminating
statements could be validly invoked in subsequent prosecutions. State v. Davidson, 242 Wis. 406, 8 N.W.2d 275 (1943). This latter rationale would be acceptable
were it not for the fact that many statutes employing language substantially identical
with that of the Kansas statute expressly require a claim, while similar statutes within the same state have no such requirement, thus rendering inconclusive the issue of
legislative intent. Compare ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 44-1824 (1956), with Ayiz. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 27-518 (1956); and compare N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59-4-8 (1960), with N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 64-27-80 (1960). See also United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1943).
It might be stated that statutes specifying that a witness may be "required," see,
e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 9028-41 (1956), or "compelled," see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 93-506
(1958), to testify generally warrant classification as claim provisions. A Florida court,
however, has interpreted a provision that "any person ... may be compelled to ...
testify" as requiring no claim of a privilege or resistance by a witness. State ex rel.
Marshall v. Petteway, 121 Fla. 822, 164 So. 872 (1936). Perhaps guidelines for classification are revealed by the observation that as far as federal statutes are concerned, few
offering automatic protection have been passed subsequent to 1930, and almost all
of this variety have required that the witness appear under oath and subject to a
subpoena. See Comment, 72 YALE LJ. 1568, 1590 (1963).
rl For a listing of state immunity statute citations, plus a description of the purpose for which immunity may be granted, see 8 WiGMORE § 2281.
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criminal immunity versus civil immunity; immunity from incrimination for all crimes disclosed versus immunity from incrimination
for only those crimes under investigation; and the conditions upon
which the grant of immunity depends.
Varieties of IntrajurisdictionalImmunity Grants
Immunity from prosecution. While all state immunity statutes
purport to protect the witness from intrajurisdictional incrimination,52 two basic kinds of insulation have been utilized: immunity
from prosecution and immunity from the use of the compelled testimony. Although initially the Counselman immunity-from-prosecution test did not have to be met by the states, most were influenced by
the Supreme Court's ruling and therefore adopted statutes similar to
that of Wyoming, which allows the state to compel testimony before
a public utilities commission in spite of a self-incrimination objection:
[N]o person having so testified shall be prosecuted or subjected to
any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction,
matter or thing concerning which he may have testified or produced
any documentary evidence; provided, that no person so testifying
shall be exempt from prosecution or punishment for perjury in so
53
testifying.
Such legislation precludes the compelling state from subsequently
bringing a criminal prosecution against the witness for any crimes
disclosed under the compulsion of the statute. 4 All states which
"A discussion of the few statutes which attempt to protect the witness from extrajurisdictional incrimination may be found in the text accompanying notes 77-79 infra.
53 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 87-35 (1959) (emphasis added).
Other state public utilities
statutes present variations on the language of the statute quoted in the text. Thus,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1402 (1959) provides that "no person shall be prosecuted,
punished or subjected to any forfeiture or penalty for or on account of any act, transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he shall have been compelled . . . to
testify .... ." CAL. PUe. UTE. ConE § 1795 (West 1956) reads: "[N]o person shall be
prosecuted, punished, or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on account of
any transaction, matter or thing concerning which, under oath, he has testified ...."
"The witness against whom prosecution is precluded by the immunity statute
must be a natural person, and not a corporation. See notes 110-14 infra and accompanying text. California makes this crystal clear: "Nothing herein contained shall be
construed as in any manner giving to any public utility immunity of any kind."
CAL. PuB. UTm. CODE § 1795 (West 1956). The reason why immunity is available
only to individuals is that only natural persons have the benefit of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906). There being
no privilege for corporate persons, the state does not need to offer immunity in exchange for testimony. It may compel the corporate person to testify without it.
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have construed such immunity-from-prosecution statutes are unanimous in holding that the protection conferred is co-extensive with
the self-incrimination provisions of their state constitutions. 55 Furthermore, even though the fifth amendment is now applicable to the
states, it is evident that such immunity provisions meet the broad
Counselman test by affording "absolute immunity against future
prosecution for the offense to which the question relates." 56
Specified crimes. Realizing that a general immunity-from-prosecution provision completely aborts the criminal law process with
respect to the witness compelled thereunder to testify, several states
have enacted statutes which attempt to limit the crimes for which
immunity from prosecution may be given. For example, an Alaska
statute authorizing compulsion of testimony in a gambling investigation specifies that "a prosecution may not afterwards be brought
against the witness for the offense of gambling or the gambling transaction concerning which he testified." 57 Such limited immunity
grants implicitly permit prosecution for other crimes on the basis of
compelled testimony. State courts, determining the validity of such
statutes under state constitutions, have not utilized a uniform rule.
Rather, they have held testimony validly compelled and immunity
constitutionally adequate under such statutes if there is no showing
that the witness will be exposed to prosecution for "unrelated
offenses" as a result of his testimony.58 However, an adequate showFurthermore, it is unanimously agreed that a witness is only accorded immunity
under immunity laws from prosecution based on his answers to questions which he
was compelled to give. No immunity need be extended if the witness voluntarily
responded to the question. See State v. Backstrom, 117 Kan. 111, 230 P. 306 (1924);
State v. Saginaw, 124 Mont. 225, 220 P.2d 1021 (1950). See generally 8 WIGMORE
§2282.
" For a listing of state cases in which immunity-from-prosecution statutes have
been held constitutionally adequate see Annot., 118 A.L.R. 602, 619-24 (1939), and
Annot., 53 A.L.R.2d 1030, 1033-40 (1957).
" Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892). In Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591 (1896), the Supreme Court held a federal immunity-from-prosecution statute
valid over a fifth amendment objection. See notes 28-31 supra and accompanying text.
Similar statutes have subsequently been approved by the Court in Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). Since most state immunity-from-prosecution statutes are
similar to the federal statutes tested, it is reasonable to assume that they too would
be deemed constitutionally acceptable under the Counselman standard.
rAi.ASKA STAT. § 11.60.150 (1962). A more generalized version of the immunityfrom-specific-prosecution statutes is ORE. RFv. STAT. § 167.520 (1965): "No indictment
or prosecution shall afterwards be brought against him for the particular offense concerning which he testified as a witness."
&8See Brown v. State, 233 Md. 288, 196 A.2d 614 (1964); Barbuto v. Silver, 19 Misc.
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ing of such a danger would seem to preclude the forcing of testimony
on the basis of such a limited immunity statute because the witness
would still retain a self-incrimination objection against such compulsion. 9 This follows from the rule that a witness's privilege
against self-incrimination is never destroyed by an immunity statute
unless that statute, as applied, provides protection co-extensive with
the privilege itself. The flexible approach of the state courts in dealing with the validity of immunity-from-specific-prosecution statutes
merits adoption by the federal courts under the Counselman test.
Under either state or federal tests, it is believed that the investigating body should be empowered to determine the adequacy of the
danger of the witness's exposure to prosecutions for non-immunized
offenses. Otherwise, the witness could capriciously refuse to testify,
and thereby frustrate the legislative purpose underlying the immunity statute.
Immunity from use. In contrast to immunity-from-prosecution
laws, a number of statutes merely preclude the subsequent use of
compelled testimony in criminal prosecutions against the witness.
Thus, if a state such as California compels a witness to testify in an
investigation of legislative bribery, that witness's "testimony shall
not afterwards be used against him in any judicial proceeding."'00
Such a statute would seemingly permit the state to prosecute the
witness for crimes he was forced to disclose, but would prohibit the
introduction of his previously-given testimony. Where the language
of the state constitutional provision against self-incrimination is
similar to the fifth amendment's, 61 many state courts have held
2d 149, 186 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (Sup. Ct. 1959); State v. Hennessey, 195 Ore. 355, 245 P.2d 875
(1952).
59See Overman v. State, 194 Ind. 483, 148 N.E. 604 (1924); Doyle v. Hofstader, 257
N.Y. 244, 177 N.E. 489 (1931); cf. State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla.
1954). An "adequate showing" of danger may be made without revealing the substance of the evidence which is incriminating. For instance, a witness may show to
the court that he may be implicated if he is required to disclose his acquaintance with
other known defendants. Since this may form a link in the chain of evidence against
him for a non-immunized crime, it would constitute an "adequate showing" of danger.
0

0 CAL. Gov'T CODE § 9054 (West 1966); see, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. AN. § 13-384
(1956); CONN. GEN. STAT. Rnv. § 12-445 (1958); FLA. STAT. § 850.60 (1965); KAN. STAT
ANN. § 25-1426 (1964); N.C. GFN. STAT. § 14-38 (1953). A variation of the immunityfrom-use statute is one which requires that compelled testimony not be used-

"directly or indirectly"-against the witness. See, e.g., ALA. ConE tit. 29, § 113 (1958)

("no testimony . . . shall in any manner ... be used as evidence, directly or indirectly . . .'); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 15:7 (1955) ("no testimony . . . shall be used directly or indirectly as evidence ....").
62Most state constitutional provisions against self-incrimination contain the same
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immunity-from-use statutes constitutionally inadequate. 62 Such legislation has not been deemed co-extensive with the state's privilege

against self-incrimination because it does not prohibit using the
testimony as a "lead" to other incriminating evidence, known as
"fruit," which may be admissible to convict the witness. 63 Furthermore, since the federal constitutional standard stated in Counselman
now applies to state law, it is clear that immunity-from-use statutes

are also invalid under the fifth amendment.64
It has been argued that the Supreme Court's adoption of a different standard in the Murphy case was an implicit rejection of the

broad Counselman standard.

Therefore, since there is no reason

why a different standard should apply to intrajurisdictional incrimi-

nation than should apply in the extrajurisdictional setting, the
65
Counselman immunity-from-prosecution test should be discarded.

Should this argument be approved in the future, state immunityfrom-use statutes would still suffer the constitutional infirmity of permitting the "fruits" of the witness's testimony to be used against him.

To avert this, state courts and legislatures could easily interpret the
prohibition against use to encompass not only the testimony itself
but also the "fruits" of the testimony. Such a construction is especially suggested by statutes which preclude the use of testimony,
66
"directly or indirectly," against the witness.

The "compromise" statute. Some states have attempted to strike
or similar wording as does the fifth amendment. However, at least two states, Iowa
and New Jersey, have no specific constitutional prohibition against self-incrimination.
A New Jersey statute stating that compelled testimony shall not be used against
the witness has been upheld on the grounds that it provided protection as complete
as would be provided by the common law privilege against self-incrimination, which
was part of New Jersey law. See In re Vince, 2 NJ. 433, 67 A.2d 141 (1949). In
Iowa, the privilege against self-incrimination has been read into the state constitution's due process clause. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 N.W. 935 (1902). In
Koonck v. Cooney, 244 Iowa 153, 55 N.W.2d 269 (1952), the Iowa court held that the
state due process provision was not violated by the compelling of testimony under a
statute which stated that no witness compelled to testify would be prosecuted "for
any crime which such testimony or evidence tends to prove or to which the same
relates." Id. at 155, 55 N.W.2d at 271.
02 See, e.g., People ex rel. Lewisohn v. O'Brien, 176 N.Y. 253, 68 N.E. 353 (1903);
State ex rel. North v. Kirtley, 327 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. 1959); Commonwealth v. Frank, 159
Pa. Super. 271, 48 A.2d 10 (1946); Dendy v. Wilson, 142 Tex. 460, 179 S.W.2d 269
(1944).
01 See, e.g., In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291 N.W. 652 (1940); cf. People v. Nowack,
180 Misc. 100, 40 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
0"See notes 17-27 supra and accompanying text.
01See Comment, 12 U.C.L.A.L. Rxv. 561, 579-85 (1965).
00 See note 60 supra.
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a compromise between complete immunity from prosecution for all
crimes disclosed and a limited immunity from prosecution for specified crimes. Such "compromise" statutes generally immunize the
witness from prosecution "for the offense with reference to which his
testimony was given,"6 7 and, in addition, preclude the use of any
testimony he may be compelled to give in "any prosecution or proceeding . . . against the person so testifying."68s

Adopting a test

similar to the one applied to immunity-from-specific-prosecution
statutes,609 it would seem that the "compromise" statute would be
unconstitutional as applied only if there was an adequate showing of
danger of exposure to prosecution for other crimes. If such a showing were made, complete immunity could not be achieved under the
Counselman test since the "fruits" of the testimony could subsequently lead to a prosecution for crimes for which the statute provides no immunity. If the compelled testimony itself were not used
in such prosecution, the statute's immunity-from-use provision
would provide no additional protection. On the other hand, if the
Murphy test were adopted intrajurisdictionally, and the term "testimony" were interpreted to include both the testimony and its
"fruits," then the statute would be constitutionally valid. If valid,
it would seem a commendable attempt to balance the need to protect
the witness with the danger of paralyzing the enforcement of criminal laws.
Immunity from civil liability. While the fifth amendment only
requires immunity from criminal prosecution,7 0 some state statutes
'7E.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 49-21-8 (1963).
"Id. (emphasis added); see, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 9, § 89 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-99 (1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 4-94 (1950).
" See notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text.

"08 WIGMOR.E § 2254. While it is clear that only penalties are proscribed by a grant
of immunity, "penalty" is not generally susceptible of precise definition. In Bognton
v. State, 75 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1954), the state sought to abate a bookmaking nuisance
and requested answers to interrogatories which the defendant claimed would incriminate him. The court held that if answers were compelled under FLA. STAT. § 982.29
(1951), the defendant would be immune from the abatement suit since it constituted a
penalty. Similarly, in Florida St. Bd. of Architecture v. Seymour, 62 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1952), an architect was deemed immune from loss of his certificate for matters he was
earlier compelled to disclose. However, a few states have attempted to define by
statute certain consequences of testifying as not constituting a "penalty." Thus, after
providing that a witness compelled to testify at an insurance investigation shall thereafter be immunized from prosecution and from "any forfeiture or penalty," Micn.
Comy. LAws § 500.2088 (Supp. 1956) states: "Provided, however, That no such individual so testifying shall be exempt ... from the refusal, revocation or suspension of
any license, permission or authority conferred, or to be conferred, pursuant to the
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nevertheless confer an immunity from remedial suits. Many of these
statutes merely preclude the use of the compelled testimony in civil
proceedings; 7 ' others expressly grant immunity from civil liability. 2
Under the Counselman test, all valid immunity statutes must protect
the witness from criminal prosecution. Therefore, if the statute immunizing the witness from civil liability does not also protect him
from criminal prosecution, it is not a valid basis for compelling testimony. Thus, for example, a statute which simply proscribes the
use of testimony in criminal or civil proceedings against the witness
would be inadequate.7 3 However, if immunity from criminal
prosecution is provided, there would be no federal constitutional
objection to a state statute which protected the witness either from
civil liability or from the use of the testimony in a civil suit.
Since states are not constitutionally required to provide immunity from remedial suits, the granting of such protection is a mere
concession by the state, based on the policy that it is unfair for a
witness who is compelled by the state to testify to be subjected to
a private suit which he might otherwise not have been forced to
defend. Although a degree of unfairness may thereby result to
potential plaintiffs where complete immunity from liability is
granted, the state's decision may be justified on the ground that the
public's need for full and untempered testimony is worth some
limitation of the individual's right to civil damages.
ExtrajurisdictionalImmunity Statutes
Originally, the possibility of extrajurisdictional use of testimony
compelled under the immunity statutes of the state and federal
insurance code." See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 90 (13) (1958); Am. STAT. ANN. § 66-3014
(1966); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-230 (1961); MAsS. GrN. LAws ANN. ch. 176D, § 13 (1955).
71L
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-12 (1963); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 1100-01
(1956); NEB. REv. STAT. § 32-1114 (1960); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:12A-90 (1963); S.D. CODE

§ 13.2505 (1939).
72"But no person who testifies or produces evidence in obedience to the com-

mand of the court in such prosecution shall be liable to any suit or prosecution,
civil or criminal, for or on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning
which he may so testify or produce evidence; provided, that no person shall be exempted
from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying." Wis. STAT.
ANN. § 325.15 (1958) (emphasis added); see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-268 (1960);
Micu. Coup. LAws § 408.620 (1948); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-354 (1953) (bribery of employees).
'1For statutes granting immunity only from the use of testimony in criminal or
civil proceedings see Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1223 (1956) and COLO. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 49-18-2 (1963).
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governments was not deemed so substantial a fear as to merit the
protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. 74 However,
with the improvement of communications, a few states recognized
that a witness compelled to testify ran a substantial risk of extrajurisdictional prosecution on the basis of his testimony. 5 Thus, state
courts in Michigan 76 and state legislatures in California 7 adopted
rules which would preclude the compulsion of testimony if a significant risk of extraterritorial incrimination would result. The
California statute is typical: "[T]he court shall order the question
answered or the evidence produced unless it finds that to do so...
could subject the witness to a criminal prosecution in another jurisdiction ...."78 This self-limitation on the states' power to grant immunity operates before the compulsion is applied to the witness. A
different approach was taken by Florida, whose statute prohibits the
state from conducting a criminal prosecution if such action is based
on evidence compelled by another jurisdiction. Thus, the Florida
statute provides:
Whenever any witness, after having claimed his privilege against
self-incrimination.. . , is instructed by order of any court of the

United States to testify... involving any interference with... the
national security or defense of the United States ... , the testimony
or production of evidence of such witness shall not be used as
evidence in any subsequent criminal proceedings against him in
any court of this state.79
However, regardless of the point at which the state's self-imposed
limitation on compulsion of evidence is made, the limitation operates against the state's own interest in acquiring needed information.
After the Supreme Court's decision in Murphy, the fifth amendment itself may be said to contain an extrajurisdictional immunity
"'See Brown

v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 608 (1896); 8 WGMORE
71See note 37 supra and accompanying text.

§ 2258;

note

31

supra.

76People v. Den Uyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W.2d 284 (1947): "'We are of the opinion
that the privilege against self-incrimination exonerates from disclosure whenever there
is a probability of prosecution in state or federal jurisdictions.'" Id. at 651, 29
N.W.2d at 287. In State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly, 71 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1954), Den Uyl
was cited with approval but was not applied since the claim of federal jeopardy was
deemed to be a mere subterfuge.
77 CAr. PEN. CODE § 1324 (West Supp. 1966).
'IsId.
7. FLA. STAT. § 932.291 (1965). The Florida provision appears to be a legislative
codification of the Murphy rule.
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provision.80 Thus, once a witness has been compelled by one jurisdiction to testify, neither his testimony nor its "fruits" can be used
against him in a prosecution by another jurisdiction-state or federal.
He may still be prosecuted for a crime disclosed by his testimony if
the prosecuting jurisdiction can show the evidence it uses has been
acquired from "an independent, legitimate source," and not as a
result of the defendant's forced testimony in another jurisdiction.8 '
The immunity provided under the Murphy rule is superior in two
respects to state efforts to eliminate the risk of extrajurisdictional incrimination. First, it frees the compelling jurisdiction to require
testimony regardless of the fear of subsequent prosecution by another jurisdiction. Secondly, the prosecuting jurisdiction may still
prosecute if it can adduce sufficient "independent" evidence. For
these reasons, the retention of statutes similar to those of Florida
and California constitutes a needless limitation of state power.
However, an addition to the salutary benefits of the Murphy
rule, it does create the risk that jurisdictions other than the compelling power will be hampered in the enforcement of their criminal
laws.8 2 To avert this possibility, several solutions have been suggested. Where there is a danger that one state's granting of immunity might lessen the chances of conviction under federal law,
Congress could, under the necessary and proper clause, require the
states to secure the approval of the United States Attorney General
before granting immunity to the witness.m However, this suggestion
assumes that the Attorney General, an official of the federal government, will be able to determine fairly whether the state's need for
information is of less importance than the United States' interest
in securing a conviction. A second suggestion, applicable to both
the federal-state and to the state-state situations, is for each compelling jurisdiction to require that the state agency conferring immunity
must first notify other jurisdictions of the impending compulsion of
the witness's testimony.84 Once notice is given, other jurisdictions
5

0See

note 45 supra and accompanying text.
2Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79 & n.18 (1964). Of course, the
risk of secret, indirect use of compelled testimony still remains. See generally Wendel,
Compulsory Immunity Legislation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 10 ST. Louis
8

U.LJ. 327 (1966).
82 Singer, State Grants of Immunity-The Problem of Interstate Prosecution Prevention, 58 J. Cams. L.C. 9- P.S. 219, 222 (1967).
18 Id. at 222-23.
8
,Id. at 222.
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would be able to inform the compelling jurisdiction of the possible
consequences to the interests of those jurisdictions. With this information available, the compelling jurisdiction could then make an
informed decision as to whether to grant immunity. Although the
possibility remains for the compelling jurisdiction to disregard the
interests of other jurisdictions, the Murphy case implies that the
choice should reside with the compelling state. This follows from
the Court's leaving with the compelling state the decision whether
to grant immunity while imposing constitutional limitations on the
use of compelled testimony solely on the jurisdiction bringing subsequent prosecution. 5 A final solution would be that adopted in
Oklahoma, which requires that information gained by compulsion
be kept secret.8 6 However, there remains the question whether such
secrecy can be maintained in face of a federal demand.
CONDITIONS FOR STATUTORY GRANTS OF IMMUNITY

The variety of existent immunity statutes is reflected in the
numerous conditions which a witness may have to meet in order to
receive statutory protection. Accepting federal constitutional standards, 7 it might seem that not every immunity grant must encompass
the entirety of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Despite objections by some courts that any immunity which
is not "absolute"8 8 will fail constitutional scrutiny,8 9 recognition has
s' "We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement this constitutional rule and
accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Governments in investigating and
prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited from making any
such use of compelled testimony and its fruits." 378 U.S. at 79.
11OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 951 (1958).
87 See Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79
(1964); Counselman v.
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585 (1892); notes 48-49 supra and accompanying text.
Il Much of the difficulty surrounding a determination of the validity of condi.
tional grants of immunity stems from the inexactness of the Counselman requirement
that the fifth amendment privilege be replaced only by "absolute" immunity. Similarly misleading is the often-repeated adage that immunity must be co-extensive with
the privilege. Literally interpreted, these phrases would seem to imply that once
any aspect of the privilege were invaded by legislation, no limit could exist upon the
insulation granted in exchange. In order to be "absolute" in this sense, immunity
could not be restricted to testimony about specific crimes; for any incrimination
resulting from otherwise privileged testimony would have to be insulated. Further,
a requirement that only subpoenaed witnesses be immunized would fail to provide
protection precisely equivalent to that afforded by the fifth amendment. But see
notes 94-97 infra and accompanying text. This literalness of interpretation may be
supported by language in the Counselman decision: "[L]egislation cannot abridge a
constitutional privilege, and . . . cannot replace or supply one, at least unless it is
so broad as to have the same extent in scope and effect." 142 U.S. at 585. That such
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been given in both federal9 ° and state9' jurisdictions to some forms
of restricted immunity grants. Current precedents yield the conclusion that conditional immunity grants are not invalid per se, but
may in particular forms lack the co-extensiveness of privilege and immunity contemplated by Counselman. The acceptability of some
limitations on statutory protection can be premised on the reasoning that the witness always retains the right to invoke the privilege
in lieu of offering a response which has not been legislatively immunized. Further, rather than constituting an overt attempt to
restrict the witness's immunity to the constitutional minimum, many
statutes, particularly those which limit protection to subjects properly before an administrative agency,92 reflect merely a legislative
intent to exchange protection only for information which will directly further the particular inquiry and to avoid indiscriminate
grants of immunity. However, by conditioning the grant of immunity, states have created a number of interpretative difficulties
which arise when a witness responds in reliance upon an offer of
immunity made without statutory authorization. 93 But in many
situations where a witness recognizes that a condition to immunity
has not been met, the practical effect may be only that the interrogator is deprived of the information he sought.
Procedural requirements. Numerous statutes require that the
witness be under oath or subject to subpoena before immunity may
be extended. 94 While testimony given without satisfaction of these
strictness is a misemphasis is suggested by reasonable analysis, i.e., because the witness
retains his privilege as to matters which cannot be immunized under a particular
statute, he cannot, upon timely claim of the privilege, be subjected to any deprivation
as a result of his refusal to testify. Therefore, a more acceptable interpretation of the
Counselman language-and one which apparently serves as a basis for restricted
immunity grants-would require that no statute compel more testimony than could
be insulated by the scope of the immunity authorized.
s0 See, e.g., Lamson v. Boyden, 160 Ill. 613, 43 N.E. 781 (1896); Overman v. State,
194 Ind. 483, 143 N.E. 604 (1924).
00 See Cannan v. United States, 19 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1927); Comment, 72 YALE L.J.
1568, 1590-91 (1963).
01See State v. Chitwood, 73 Ariz. 314, 317, 240 P.2d 1202, 1204 (1952) (dictum); Commonwealth v. Collier, 181 Ky. 319, 204 S.W. 74 (1918).
112See, e.g., NEv. REy. STAT. § 522.100 (1963); S.D. CODE § 42.0708 (Supp. 1960). See
also discussion accompanying notes 131-35 infra.
03 See notes 132-35 infra and accompanying text.
04 Statutes requiring that witness be under subpoena: CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 80-4-8 (2) (b) (1963); MINN. STAT. § 30.45 (1961); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18-8 (1965). Statutes requiring witness to be under oath: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, § 187 (1953); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 23-807 (1948); N.J. REv. STAT. § 5:8-15 (1959). Statutes requiring that
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conditions may lead to prosecution, their nonexistence will support
a respondent's assertion of inapplicability of the immunity statute
and, thus, availability of the privilege. However, the existence of
the necessary conditions to the immunity grant is frequently difficult
to ascertain, especially for the lay witness. An illustration of this
dilemma is provided by a 1927 federal circuit court decision having
precedential value for state proceedings since Malloy.95 Construing
a federal statute96 which grants immunity only when testimony is
offered under oath and pursuant to a subpoena, the court held that
answers propounded under oath pursuant to a duly-authorized administrative investigation were not immune from further use, absent
formal receipt of a subpoena by the witness.07 Thus, when the
governing statute is one which does not require a prior claim for
immunity to attach,98 a witness is placed in a somewhat anomalous
position of determining whether conditions not within his control
have been met. While it can be presumed that deliberate misrepresentations by the interrogator that immunity was available would not
meet due process requirements, a much more difficult question is
raised-and so far, left without definitive answer 0 -when the interrogator's negligence or inadvertence has produced a witness's supposition of immunity.100
In an attempt to avoid the abuse inherent in a witness's employment of an immunity statute to "cleanse" himself of past crimes
with little concomitant benefit to the state, some legislatures have
drafted statutes which would confer no immunity to a witness testifywitness be under either subpoena or oath: MINN. STAT. § 297.09 (1961); MINN. STAT.
§ 297.37 (1961). Statutes requiring witness to be under both subpoena and oath:
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 163d (Smith-Hurd 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 67j/2, § 278
(Smith-Hurd 1959); McsH. CoMP. LAws § 462.27 (1948); Mo. REv. STAT. § 144.340
(1959); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-6 (1950).
"r See notes 24-27 supra and accompanying text.
11 Federal Trade Commission Act § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1964).
97 Cannan v. United States, 19 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1927). See also Sherwin v. United
States, 268 U.S. 369 (1925).
98 See note 50 supra.
9"In State v. Chitwood, 73 Ariz. 161, 239 P.2d 353 (1951), modified, 73 Ariz. 314,
240 P.2d 1202 (1952), a witness had not been advised as to the point in the questioning
after which immunity would no longer attach. Without attempting to evaluate
whether the interrogator's omission was deliberate or negligent, the court was willing
to extend immunity to testimony which was not spedfically immunized by the statute.
Accord, Overman v. State, 194 Ind. 483, 143 N.E. 604 (1924).
100
See notes 132-36 infra and accompanying text.
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ing because of his own "procurement or contrivance." 10 1 It would
appear that this condition could qualify either the voluntariness of
the testimony or the occasion of the witness's appearance before a
body which could grant immunity. To interpret the language to
mean that immunity is not available for voluntary, noncompelled
testimony does not violate fifth amendment standards, for the privilege attaches only to compulsorily-procured testimony. 0 2 Mississippi,

however, has interpreted its statute to grant immunity without regard
to the voluntariness of enunciations as long as the witness's appearance has not been the result of his own manipulations. 10 3 This analysis, while granting an immunity more extensive than that demanded
by fifth amendment precedents, avoids the necessity for a judiciary
to delve into the question of the witness's subjective motivations at
the time of his appearance.
Testimonial verity. Those statutes which grant immunity only
when the witness testifies "truthfully" or "fully and without reserve" apparently reflect the simplistic legislative intent that the state
will forego its right of prosecution only if it has received reliable information. 0 4 It is established that the statutory immunity does not
insulate against prosecution for perjury unless explicitly indicated
in the enactment. 05 Constitutional standards probably are not met,
however, if untruthfulness as to certain aspects of one's testimony is
employed as a basis for withdrawal of immunity for other utterances. Since the fifth amendment privilege is granted to any statement which may provide a segment of the evidential development of
proof of criminality, 0 6 and since such privilege can be avoided only
101See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 6-815 (Supp. 1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 3337 (1956);
Miss.
1 CODE ANN. § 3365-08 (1956).
02See 8 WIGMORE § 2282, at 514.
103 See State v. Billups, 179 Miss. 352, 174 So. 50 (1937).
20-Statutes requiring the witness to testify truthfully: e.g., ALA. CODE fit. 17, § 233
(1958); TEx. Rav. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 7446 (1960). Statutes requiring the witness to
testify fully and without reserve: e.g., FLA. STAT. § 542.11 (1965); OKrA. STAT. ANN. fit.
21, § 391 (1958); TEx. PEN. CoDE ANN. art. 1621 (1953).
10
1 See Gllckstein v. United States, 222 U.S. 139 (1911); People v. Berger, 197 Misc.
915, 100 N.Y.S.2d 278 (Sup. Ct. 1950); State v. Ingels, 4 Wash. 2d 676, 104 P.2d 944,
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 708 (1940). Many statutes expressly exempt prosecutions for
perjury from the grant of immunity. E.g., UTAu CODE ANN. § 34-1-11 (1966); VA.
CODE ANN. § 60-38 (1949); WAss. REv. CODE § 49.60.150 (1958). See also Chitwood v.
Eyman, 74 Ariz. 334, 248 P.2d 884 (1952).
100 See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951); Blau v. United
States, 340 U.S. 159, 161 (1950); Falknor, Self-Crimination Privilege: "Links in the
Chain" 5 VAND. L. REV. 479 (1952).
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by respondent's waiver or a grant of immunity, 0 7 to allow prosecution on otherwise protected testimony accompanying perjured utterances amounts to an equation of partial falsehood with waiver, a
conclusion unsupported by even vague precedential implications.
Further, availability of prosecution for perjury would seem to provide a sufficient remedy when the legislative desire for reliable information is frustrated: the unperjured portion of a witness's testimony may have no significantly diminished utility to the state merely
because of accompanying untruthfulness.1 0 8
While vagueness inherent in a statute drafted with immunity
seemingly conditioned upon the truthfulness of the testimony raises
a substantial difficulty, it has been avoided in at least one jurisdiction by perceptive judicial interpretation. In Ferrantellov. State, 0
the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas reasoned that since a witness
testifying under oath is required to respond accurately, the language
of the immunity statute could be given no independent effect. This
failure to find the statute's immunity conditional led to the conclusion that the statutory protection did comport with the constitutional requirement that it be co-extensive with the privilege against
self-incrimination.
Qualification of the grantee. While many immunization statutes
state that "no person" may invoke the self-incrimination privilege
against demanded information, either in the from of testimony or
documents, these same statutes generally shield only a "natural person" from prosecution on the basis of such evidence. 10 According
207 See Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
108If truthful portions of a witness's testimony are used to discover non-verbal evidence against other parties, the value of his testimony would seem undiminished by
the existence of perjured portions. If the witness's verbal implication of another participant were introduced at a subsequent trial, however, the use of earlier perjured
testimony to attack the informer's creditability would, of course, significantly lessen
his utility in securing a conviction.
209 158 Tex. Crim. 471, 482, 256 S.W.2d 587, 595
(1952).
210 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 377.32
(1965); ILL. AN. STAT. ch. 5, § 158 (Smith-I-urd
1966); MINN. STAT. § 30.45 (1961); NF. REv. STAT. §57-912(1) (1960).
Conceivably, such statutes might be interpreted to deny immunity to individuals
altogether on a rationale similar to that utilized by the Supreme Court in Shapiro v.
United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). In that case a federal immunity statute granted
prosecutorial protection to those who produced records or testified in an investigation of
price-ceiling violations. Reasoning that since Congress had required such records to be
kept for the purposes of regulation and enforcement, the Court held that no privilege
existed as to the inculpatory material and thus the immunity provisions were inapplicable. Id. at 22-25. In a similar manner, a state court might reason that
because an individual has no privilege against the production of inculpatory organiza-
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to traditional constitutional doctrine, an organization, particularly
a regulated economic form, is not a "natural person"." within the
terms of fifth amendment applications. Thus, neither the group nor
its agent-officers may invoke the privilege against the production of
incriminatory associational records." 2 At the same time, organizational officials have retained protection against compulsory oral
testimony." 3 Consequently, if these statutes extend immunity to a
"natural person" who produces incriminatory organizational records,
the protection granted to the individual officer is greater than that
afforded by the Federal Constitution. However, even though an
organization can act only through such protected individuals, the
entity itself remains vulnerable because of the statutory phrasing.
Language in several statutes that inculpatory protection will not be
granted to specified industrial or service corporations arguably leaves
a negative implication of general organizational immunity." 4 However, these statutes do not contain the "natural person" limitation
in the immunity grant, but rather state that "no person" shall be
prosecuted on the basis of the compelled disclosure. Thus, it seems
clear that by specifically denying incriminatory protection to the
investigated organization, these states merely utilized an alternative
method to grant immunity to "natural persons" only.
Immunity conditioned on fear of a specific kind of incrimination. Both the wisdom and the constitutionality of one variety of
state immunity statute may be questioned. Such a statute typically
grants immunity from any incrimination if the witness is compelled
to testify after asserting a fear of a specific kind of incrimination.
Michigan's provision compelling testimony of a witness in the investigation of a judgment debtor's affairs provides an example:
tional records, the immunity grant is insufficient to prevent his prosecution. See id.;
Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 861 (1911). But see Note, 1968 DUKE L.J. 184.
22 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 861 (1911); Hale v. Henkel, 201 US. 48 (1906)
(corporate officer cannot raise privilege against testifying to acts of corporation or producing its records because protected by immunity statute); cf. United States v. White,
822 U.S. 694 (1944) (identifying "natural" as "personal" but allowing "personal" groups
to invoke the privilege). But ef. Shapiro v. United States, 885 U.S. 1 (1948) (individuals required to keep regulatory records may not invoke privilege with respect
thereto).
122See cases cited note 111 supyra. But cf. Communist Party v. United States,
389 F.2d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Note, 1968 DUKE L.J. 184.
" See Curcio v. United States, 854 U.S. 118 (1957).
114 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1795 (West 1956); HAWAII REv. LAWs. § 104-9
(1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 61-606 (1948).
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A party... may not be excused from answering a question on the
ground that his answer will tend to show him guilty of the commission of a fraud ....
But an answer cannot be used as evidence
against the persons so answering in any criminal proceeding or
action.115
Since statutes like the Michigan provision usually preclude the use
of compelled answers against the witness, they would be invalid
under the Counselman test, as well as under the constitutions of
many states. 116 However, should a state choose to incorporate into
this type of statute an immunity from prosecution, as Kansas has
done, 1 7 the Counselman standard would be satisfied.
However, assuming the constitutionality of such an immunity
statute, and acknowledging that its enactment was an attempt to limit
the granting of immunity solely to situations where the privilege is
especially apt to thwart the particular investigation, a definite question as to the statute's ability to serve state interests remains. On the
one hand, should the witness claim, either in good or bad faith, that
he fears his answers will incriminate him in the manner specified by
the statute (i.e., for fraud), he will be immunized from. prosecution
for any crimes disclosed, including those not under investigation,
even if they do not involve fraud. As a result, more crimes may be
immunized than is necessary. Moreover, there is virtually no way
that the state can minimize the risk of this result by inquiry beforehand as to the witness's good faith in claiming his fear of fraud, without probing into the very matter the privilege is designed to protect.
On the other hand, if the witness claims he fears incrimination for
a crime different from that specified by the statute, the state lacks
the power, by virtue of the conditional nature of the statute, to immunize the witness and thereby to destroy his basis for asserting the
privilege against self-incrimination. This produces a complete
115

Mtcm CoMP. LAws

GEN. STAT. REV.

§

§600.6110 (Supp. 1961) (emphasis added); see

52-398 (1958); MONT. REv. CoDas ANN.

§ 93-5909

CONN.
(1964); S.C. CODE

ANN. § 10-1723 (1962); WAs. REV. CODE § 6.32.200 (1956).
ie See notes 62-64 supra and accompanying text.
1
27 KAN. GEN STAT. ANN. § 21-943 (1964) provides: "No person shall be incapacitated
or excused from testifying touching any offense committed by another against [gambling
laws] . . . by reason of having participated in any prohibited games or played at or
with any gambling device prohibited by the laws of the state of Kansas, but no person
shall be prosecuted or punished on account of any transaction, matter or thing concerning which lie may be so required to testify or produce evidence ....
(emphasis
added).
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frustration of the state's purpose in enacting the statute-to acquire
needed information. Again, no state inquiry into the basis of the
witness's assertion that he fears incrimination in a way other than
specified by the statute is possible.
Immunity grants conditioned on subsequent occurrences. Because the fifth amendment privilege is absolute in the sense that
no prosecution can result from compelled incrimination,"" an attempt to condition immunity upon occurrences subsequent to its
having been given is contrary to constitutional mandates insofar
as the witness must endure the possibility of future prosecution.
Shortly after the Counselman decision, states began re-evaluating
their immunity statutes to eliminate phraseology which might provide an insulation against prosecution less pervasive than that demanded under the fifth amendment. In the exemplary decision of
Lamson v. Boyden," 9 the Supreme Court of Illinois declared unconstitutional the immunity provision of a statute prohibiting
"cornering" in grain markets. Under this statutory scheme, immunity was granted when certain disclosures were made, provided
profits received by the witness through market manipulation were
relinquished. 20 Quoting Counselman language, the court stated
that the immunity statute "is unconstitutional unless it affords
'absolute immunity against future prosecution for the offense to
which the question relates.' "1121 Under the Illinois court's interpretation, the utterance of incriminating evidence alone was sufficient
to immunize the witness against any form of prosecution by the
state. To require, in addition, the subsequent relinquishment of
profits was to impose a condition making the immunity less than
"absolute."
Though this reasonable interpretation of Counselman is applicable to any statute which would condition immunity upon
occurrences subsequent to incrimination, an Oklahoma election
bribery provision, 2 2 which has counterparts in other jurisdictions, -3
118
Such is the current intrajurisdictional implication of the fifth amendment.
See text following note 47 supra.
110120160 111. 613, 43 N.E. 781 (1896).
An Ohio statute attempting to encourage restrictions of gambling winnings
remains in force. Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3763.05 (Page 1954).
121160 Ill.
at 620, 43 N.E. at 783.
122 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.

12

See, e.g., N.H. REv.

26, § 446 (1955).
§ 69:28 (1955). See also Ky.REv.

STAT. ANN.

STAT.

(1962); LA. RLv.STAT. § 14:121 (1950); MicK. Comip. LAWs § 750.125 (1948).

§ 124.330

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 1968: 311

would under some interpretations immunize only upon procurement
of a conviction pursuant to compelled information. The questionable validity of the statute is compounded by confusing drafting.
The first sentence of the statute provides that a witness may be compelled to testify but that any testimony elicited will not be used
in a subsequent prosecution against the witness; a second sentence
allows immunity from prosecution for one "who voluntarily discloses ...

evidence... and procures a conviction .... "

If the stricter Counselman standard were applicable, 2 4 both provisions would fail constitutional scrutiny: the first for its failure to
immunize against prosecution and the latter because it would allow
prosecution in instances in which disclosure did not lead to successful
prosecution of one other than the witness. Under the Murphy
criterion, 2 5 the statute as a whole would be valid, since a witness
testifying pursuant to any form of compulsion could be immunized
from future use of any incriminating statements by application of
the general provisions of the first sentence. The conditional immunity from prosecution provided by the second provision simply
seems a legislative extension of immunity not compelled by the fifth
amendment but enacted to give state agencies more power to bargain
for information. Its conditional nature would not be subject to a
fifth amendment challenge because the statute's protection could,
under no circumstances, fall below the constitutionally valid immunity-from-use provision. However, the latter sentence might give
rise to frequent due process objections if it were invoked against
a witness who did not give evidence leading to prosecution but whose
testimony was elicited pursuant to an assurance of immunity or other
indicia sufficient to produce the type of compulsion contemplated by
the fifth amendment. 2 6 The potential interpretative difficulties of
the Oklahoma statute are avoided by careful drafting in a similar
Louisiana provision. 2 7 This latter statute makes it clear that a grant
of immunity from prosecution is a supplemental measure to be employed at the district attorney's discretion in situations in which complete immunity might ensure fuller disclosure of illegal transactions.
The grant of immunity from prosecution clearly reflects a legis124See text accompanying note 48 supra.
1

25

See notes 38-42 supra and accompanying text.
at 514.

126See 8 WIGMoRE § 2282,
127

LA. R.

STAT. § 14:121 (1950).
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lative intent to encourage revelation of illegal transactions by one
perpetrator of a multi-party crime, such as bribery, which lacks manifestations which would be readily identifiable by investigating
officials. 1 28 While such facilitation of investigations is desirable,
conditioning immunity upon procurement of a conviction-or as in
other statutes, upon the "tendency" of the testimony to incriminate
another129-may produce unjustifiable practical results. Whether
conviction of another results from testimony depends on a myriad of
contingencies beyond the control of the witness. For example, the
anticipated insulation may be lost because of a prosecutor's decision
not to pursue a conviction. 130 It might also be argued that this conditional grant of immunity lacks fairness to the person eventually
prosecuted. Thus, the prospective informer is placed in a position
of having to anticipate the resolution of an untried prosecution, and,
in order to ensure his immunization, he may either present perjured
testimony or fail to relate exculpating facts. Moreover, contrary to
its intended result, the contingent immunity statute tends to promote less than full disclosure since participants in a crime who know
factors which would limit the defendant's criminal liability are given
no impetus to volunteer their evidence. The defendant's disadvantage could be equalized in many situations, however. Assuming
the identity of witnesses possessing such exculpatory information can
be made known to a prosecutor, their testimony could be compelled
under those statutes, such as the Oklahoma provision discussed
above, which provide general immunity from subsequent use of incriminating testimony.
The requirement of pertinency. A provision adopted in several
states for furthering administrative investigations restricts immunity
to responses which are "pertinent to some question lawfully before
',131 The legislative purpose in enacting such
such commission ....
a provision is apparent; i.e., any matter which would not promote
the particular investigation would be of little or no value to the
128See Reporter's Comment, LA. REy. STAT. ANN. § 14:121 (1951).

120 See, e.g., Micir. Com'. LAws § 750.125 (1948).
180To make a grant of immunity depend upon such factors as the adequacy of
the prosecutor's preparation for the trial of the implicated party or his post-arrest
treatment is, of course, to effectively discourage fullest cooperation on the part of the
informer.
211 N.M.STAT. ANN. § 64-27-80 (t) (Supp. 1967). See also FLA. STAT. § 377.32 (1965);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 522.100 (1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-12 (1960); S.D. CODE § 42.0708

(Supp. 1960).
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state and absent receipt of some benefit, the government should not
forego its power to prosecute, an affront to its criminal statutes. In
its most common format, this type of immunity statute is introduced
by a statement that the privilege against self-incrimination may not
be invoked. This broad assertion is then tempered by preservation
of the fifth amendment privilege for impertinent matters. Finally,
immunity against prosecution is granted for any matter revealed
which is pertinent. Thus, when a witness refuses to respond to a
question which is clearly irrelevant, he seems to be within the exemption from compulsion intended by the legislature. In situations involving inquiries which are less clearly unrelated to the scope of an
agency's investigatory powers, the witness faces a dilemma: if he
refuses to answer, he must endure a possible contempt citation; 18 2
if he answers and the question is not relevant to the body's investigation, he may find himself outside the scope of the statute's immunization. A similarly difficult question is raised when a witness testifies
without contesting the pertinency of the particular inquiry and
claims immunity at a subsequent prosecution based on incriminating, though irrelevant, revelations. Since he could not have been
compelled to make such disclosures, the prosecutor may argue, he
was not entitled to fifth amendment protection as to their substance.
In the absence of a claim of the privilege, the witness might now be
deemed to have waived his right against self-incrimination. A further basic objection to a requirement of pertinency is that it places
on the witness the tremendous burden of relating a specific question
to all matters under the general consideration of the investigating
agency. Not only would the layman have to ascertain the outline of
subjects touched on by other witnesses, but he would also have to
assure himself of the statutory authorization for every aspect of the
investigation. Even assuming the ability of the witness to isolate the
proper considerations, he would bear the risk of misjudging the
pertinency of the particular inquiry.
Judicial relief from these dilemmas might be obtained under
precedents in an analogous area. Several courts have held that a
witness who has testified under a statute which immunizes for only
specific crimes can prevent, in a subsequent prosecution, the use
232 Cf. State v. Chitwood, 75 Ariz. 161, 170, 239 P.2d 353, 359 (1951), modified, 73
Ariz. 14, 240 P.2d 1202 (1952).
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of testimony as to unrelated violations by virtue of the continuing
183
efficacy of the fifth amendment as to non-immunized offenses.
However, without attempting to delineate this conclusion in terms
of fifth amendment or state constitutional mandates, judicial recognition has been given to the difficulty encountered by a defendant
in attempting to ascertain whether a particular revelation furthers
the investigation of a crime to which immunity attaches or whether
his particular response advances the inquiry beyond protected
limits. 8 4 At least one court has found immunization necessary
because of the possibility that the interrogator may, either intentionally or by inadvertence, bear responsibility for leading the witness
5
into unrelated areas.'Y
Under a statute which requires the witness to claim his privilege
against self-incrimination before immunity will be granted, the issue
of pertinency may lose some of its significance, since it might be
legitimately argued that a failure to raise an appropriate objection
amounts to a waiver of the constitutional privilege. Such a proposition, however, provides an unsatisfactory resolution when the interrogator has in any manner produced a witness's assumption that his
incriminatory statements could not be employed in a subsequent
prosecution against him. It would seem preferable to place upon
the interrogator some responsibility for specifying the limits of the
statutory immunity grant, particularly if he has, as is usually the
case, prefaced his questioning with an explanation of the witness's
duty to testify.
CONCLUSION

Since the 1964 decisions in Malloy and Murphy have dictated
the invalidity of many of the existent immunity provisions, it might
be assumed that intensive legislative re-evaluations would have
taken place subsequent to those pronouncements. Evidence of corrective undertakings is, however, almost nonexistent. Perhaps the
181See State ex rel. Mitchell v. Kelly,
State, 194 Ind. 483, 143 N.E. 604 (1924).
281State v. Chitwood, 73 Ariz. 161, 170,
314, 240 P.2d 1202 (1952).
185
Id. But cf. United States v. Ford,
Watkins Co., 127 F. Supp. 97 (D. Minn.

(1874).

71 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1954); cf. Overman v.
239 P.2d 353, 359 (1951), modified, 73 Ariz.
99 U.S. 594 (1879); United States v. J.R.
1954); People v. Indian Peter, 48 Cal. 250
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failure of the Supreme Court to reassess the current applicability
of the Counselman precedent can be isolated as a partial cause of
this inaction. Nonetheless, questions substantially unaffected by
Counselman, such as the need for extrajurisdictional immunity
grants, would seem to deserve current attention.
When legislatures commence the necessary reconsideration, an
opportunity would be afforded for a thorough restructuring of a
statutory framework. A single, all inclusive immunity provision
might then replace the current piecemeal approach to satisfaction
of constitutional standards. Since the old system of grants limited
to specific investigations has presented inconsistent phrasing which
precludes meaningful ascertainment of legislative intent, implementation of a central immunity statute could eliminate many interpretative difficulties. Absent such a radical alteration, the several
hundred immunity statutes will be open to individual constitutional evaluations by both federal and state courts.

